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This article examines the extent to which judges have a responsibility to engage in 
subversive legal interpretations. It begins by showing that despite strong legal and 
political discourses, there remains space for the judge to resist the force of these 
discourses. To illustrate this point, the article discusses the strong and unified crisis 
discourse that was used to justify the shift in legal discourse from prosecution of 
terrorism to prevention of terrorism after 9/11. Subsequently, Jacques Derrida's 
concept of iterability is used to examine how space to resist crisis discourse was present 
and used by the court of first instance in the seminal post-9/11 terrorism case of Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld. The article proceeds to address the conditions under which the judge had 
the responsibility to resist this crisis discourse. Here Derrida's work on undecidability 
is brought into conversation with Ronald Dworkin's classic theory of judicial 
interpretation. In doing so, I push beyond Dworkin's recognition of the role of political 
morality in legal interpretation and show that the judge cannot engage in legal 
interpretation without becoming a participant in the struggle over meaning. This 
article provides judges guidance in responding to their inevitable implication in this 
struggle. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
After the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and on the 
Pentagon in Washington DC on September 11, 2001 scholars observed a shift 
in Western legal approaches to terrorism. Instead of the previously dominant 
criminal law approach, an administrative law and precautionary oriented 
approach to terrorism gained traction as the way to deal with terrorist threats 
both in government policy and judicial decisions.1 Studies have shown how a 
crisis discourse was deployed to enable and justify this shift.2 Crisis discourse 
was present in political and legal realms and worked to emphasize the 
(supposed) unique and existential threat posed by international terrorism to 
civilization. It posited that the threat posed by terrorism could only be 
avoided if the ways of dealing with it were fundamentally changed, 
specifically, from after-the-fact prosecution of terrorism as a crime to 
precautionary military or administrative action. 
This article first shows that judges had opportunity to resist this crisis 
discourse. Secondly, it argues that judges had a responsibility to resist crisis 
discourse, to the extent it aimed to justify the permanent exclusion of a 
person from the political community. These claims are fleshed out by 
bringing Jacques Derrida's reading of iterability into conversation with 
                                                 
1 Rens van Munster, 'The War on Terrorism: When the Exception Becomes the Rule' 
(2004) 17 International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 141; Douglas Feith, 'Council 
on Foreign Relations: Progress in the Global War on Terrorism', Washington DC, 
13 November 2003; Marieke de Goede and Beatrice de Graaf, 'Sentencing Risk: 
Temporality and Precaution in Terrorism Trials' (2013) 7 International Political 
Sociology 313, 328; and Filip Gelev, 'Checks and Balances of Risk Management: 
Precautionary Logic and the Judiciary' (2011) 37 Review of International Studies 2237. 
2 See Laura M. Henderson, 'Crisis in the Courtroom: The Discursive Conditions of 
Possibility for Ruptures in Legal Discourse' (2018) 47 Netherlands Journal of Legal 
Philosophy 49 and Laura M. Henderson, 'Crisis Discourse: A Catalyst for Legal 
Change?' (2014) 5 Queen Mary Law Journal 1. 
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Ronald Dworkin's classic work on legal interpretation. I explore Derrida's 
iterability in the first post-9/11 case, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,3  that evidenced the 
shift from a prosecutorial approach toward a precautionary approach. After 
analyzing the first instance court's subversive attitude to the crisis discourse 
in Hamdi, I proceed to a more general claim about the judge's role and 
responsibility in legal interpretation. In effect, I use the context of the War 
on Terror and the Hamdi case to reveal something about the law that was 
always there: its 'structured undecidability'.4 
Let me set out the line of reasoning this article follows: my reading of Derrida 
shows that the interpretation of what the 'law' 'is' is an activity inescapably 
affected by chains of meaning, structured into discourses that shape legal 
meaning. I define 'discourse' here as ways of speaking or writing that both 
represent and create our shared understanding of a particular issue by 
defining what is and is not appropriate, 'what knowledge is considered useful, 
relevant, and ''true'' in that context; and what sorts of person or ''subjects'' 
embody its characteristics'.5 Both legal and political discourses affect the 
interpretation of law, including the crisis discourse discussed above. At the 
same time, and crucially, despite the strong structuring force of dominant 
discourses on the field of (legal) meaning, this structure retains a residual 
undecidability. It is this residual undecidability that provides the interpreter 
with space, albeit limited, to subvert the dominant discourse. In this article, 
I refer to the dual nature of legal interpretation – its determination by 
discourse and its undecidability – as a 'structured undecidability'. In other 
words, law is structured by discourse; nevertheless it is never fully defined by 
the meaning given by this discourse.6 The notion of structured undecidability 
highlights how the interpretation of law's meaning is both subject to the 
disciplining force of discourse that imposes meaning on us and to the 
unavoidable partial ambiguity of it. This ambiguity gives space for 
                                                 
3 Supreme Court of the United States, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), slip op. 
4 Ernesto Laclau, 'Deconstruction, Pragmatism, Hegemony' in Chantal Mouffe (ed), 
Deconstruction and Pragmatism (London, Routledge 1996) 57. 
5 Stuart Hall, 'Introduction', in Stuart Hall (ed), Representation: Cultural Representations 
and Signifying Practices (London, Sage 1997) 6. 
6 Laclau 1996 (n 4) 57. 
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undermining the force of the discourse by allowing for a deferral of dominant 
meanings in favor of other possible readings. 
In the face of this undecidability, however structured it may be, legal 
interpretation is a process that can only be resolved by a decision. I use 
Derrida to push Dworkin's view on legal interpretation to acknowledge the 
role power relations play in Dworkin's process of 'advancing the enterprise' 
of law.7  While not denying the role Dworkin assigns to political morality in 
legal interpretation, I argue in favor of Derrida's emphasis on the essentially 
unstable nature of (legal) meaning. Moreover, I highlight the exertion of 
power necessary to achieve the fictitious stability that is a prerequisite for 
legal interpretation. By attending to the moment of decision in legal 
interpretation, it becomes clear that the rule of law is paradoxically dependent 
on the rule of man.8 A general, underdetermined law is applied to a particular 
case by doing two contradictory things at the same time: enforcing 'the law in 
a non-arbitrary way' and respecting 'the ways in which each case is different'.9 
It is for this application of the general to the particular that the law depends 
on individual, (wo)man-made decisions.10 The law thus depends on judicial 
decisions and 'forms of popular political action that engage in […] struggle 
with legal structures and institutions' to enact the law in concrete situations.11 
Focusing on this necessary moment of decision in the face of undecidability 
pushes the discussion beyond the question of which legal interpretation is 
'right'. In this way, this article aims to augment the traditional legal interest 
in the 'right answer' by instead providing guidance on how legal decision-
makers can responsibly engage in the conflicts of interpretation they will 
inevitably encounter, conflicts that in the end must be resolved through 
decision. 
Concretely, this article makes these arguments in the following three 
sections. After the introduction, section II centers on the Derridean concept 
                                                 
7 Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press 
1985) 159. 
8 Bonnie Honig, Emergency Politics: Paradox, Law, Democracy (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press 2009) 66. 
9 William W. Sokoloff, 'Between Justice and Legality: Derrida and Decision' (2005) 
58 Political Research Quarterly 341, 342.  
10 Ibid. 
11 Honig 2009 (n 8) 66. 
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of iterability. Iterability emphasizes the repeatability of language, while at 
the same time stressing that language always changes its meaning within each 
new context it is used. Iterability reveals the space of undecidability in legal 
interpretation, despite the strongly dominant crisis discourse that structured 
much legal interpretation after 9/11. This section starts with a brief 
introduction to the case Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the case I use to highlight the 
iterable nature of law, and the crisis discourse used therein by the different 
levels of the judicial institution that ruled on this case. I subsequently engage 
in a close reading of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld to show how the judge in the court of 
first instance played with the terms of the crisis discourse already present in 
both the government's public speech and legal submissions. I argue that the 
judge made these terms mean something different, while at the same time 
repeating them. 
Section III asks how judges should decide in this context of structured 
undecidability. Here, I compare my view on the iterable nature of law to 
Ronald Dworkin's famous call for judges to interpret based on the principles 
of fit and justification, and the political morality of a legal system. While 
Dworkin acknowledges the aspect of construction inherent in legal 
interpretation, he fails to fully recognize the power struggle involved in the 
construction of unity from the undecidable field of legal meaning. Instead of 
denying the role of power in constructing unity, legal scholars should ask the 
question how the judge can legitimately decide in conditions of 
undecidability. Section IV concludes the article. 
II. ITERABILITY IN THE CRISIS DISCOURSE OF HAMDI V. RUMSFELD12 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld was the first case heard by the United States Supreme 
Court on post-9/11 anti-terrorism measures. It dealt with the issue of whether 
the detention of Mr. Hamdi, a US citizen captured in Afghanistan without 
any subsequent criminal charges (and initially without access to a lawyer), 
violated the due process clause of the US Constitution. The government 
argued that Mr. Hamdi was an enemy combatant and that interests of 
national security, the threat posed by terrorism, and the ongoing hostilities 
                                                 
12 This section draws on Laura M. Henderson, 'Crisis Discourse: A Catalyst for Legal 
Change?' (2014) 5 Queen Mary Law Journal 1. 
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together justified the preventive detention of Mr. Hamdi without access to a 
lawyer. The government also argued that this preventive detention should 
only be subject to highly deferential judicial review.13 The US Supreme Court 
ultimately held the detention to be unconstitutional in this case, but not 
because preventive detention was unconstitutional as such. The Supreme 
Court rejected the government's claim that the factual basis for Mr. Hamdi's 
detention was not subject to judicial review. However, and significantly, the 
Supreme Court accepted the government's argument that it was authorized 
to detain Mr. Hamdi preventively as an unlawful enemy combatant.  
This decision was part of a general shift toward a precautionary approach to 
terrorism, that took place after 2001. As Hafetz has noted, in the years since 
the attacks on the World Trade Centers, an 'alternative, military-based 
approach [to terrorism], rooted in the language and logic of a global armed 
conflict against al Qaeda and associated terrorist organizations' has become 
an institutionalized part of legal discourse.14 The 'starting point of post-9/11 
security politics' became 'prevention rather than defense against actual 
threat'.15 A 'discourse on eventualities' developed that called for a 'permanent 
military policing through the mechanisms of prevention and pre-emption'.16 
The judiciary has been intimately involved in this shift toward precaution, as 
Gelev has described. 'The judiciary adopts the logic of precaution in exactly 
the same way as the other two branches of government … courts are central 
to the precautionary risk rationality of government.'17 Here, too, in the Hamdi 
case we see this precautionary discourse being furthered by the Supreme 
Court's acceptance of a lower standard of review for preventive, 
administrative detention than that for detainees suspected of a criminal 
offense. The Supreme Court explained that this lower standard of review was 
necessary to 'alleviate … [the] uncommon potential [of procedural 
guarantees] to burden the executive at a time of on-going military conflict'.18 
                                                 
13 Henderson 2014 (n 12) 10. 
14 Jonathan Hafetz, 'Military Detention in the ''War on Terrorism'': Normalizing the 
Exceptional after 9/11,' (2012) 112 Columbia Law Review Sidebar 31. 
15 Van Munster (n 1) 146. 
16 Ibid 142. 
17 Gelev (n 1) 2241, 2240. 
18 Supreme Court of the United States, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), slip 
op., 26-27. 
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The Supreme Court upheld the precautionary approach to terrorism engaged 
in by the government, although it ensured that some judicial review of the 
government's factual assertions would be possible. 
The decisions by the US Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals both used 
crisis discourse to justify their precautionary approach. I define 'crisis 
discourse' here as a discourse that links the (presumed) existential threat of 
terrorism to the (presumed) need for structural legal change. This discourse 
emphasized the existential and unique nature of the threat posed by 
international terrorism and used it to rhetorically justify a departure from 
normal (legal) rules and procedures. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit employed crisis discourse by highlighting the unique nature of the 
case under consideration and arguing that the normal way for such a case to 
proceed was not appropriate under the current circumstances: 
The [lower] court's order was not merely a garden-variety appointment of 
counsel in an ordinary criminal case. If it had been, the lower court's 
discretion would be almost plenary and hardly a subject for appeal, much less 
reversal. But the June 11 order was different in kind. In the face of on-going 
hostilities, the district court issued an order that failed to address the many 
serious questions raised by Hamdi's case.19 
Further, this court saw a risk of 'saddling military decision-making with the 
panoply of encumbrances associated with civil litigation'20 and decided 'the 
development of facts may pose special hazards of judicial involvement in 
military decision-making'.21 In articulating these risks, the court adhered to 
the terms of crisis discourse, which portrayed the normal legal rules as posing 
too large a risk in such exceptional times. According to the crisis discourse, 
these normal legal rules must thus be changed. 
The US Supreme Court's decision in Hamdi evidenced a similar use of crisis 
discourse. The Supreme Court reasoned that 'the exigencies of the 
                                                 
19 United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Decision 
on Appeal before Judges Wilkinson, Wilkins and Traxler (12 July 2002) Joint 
Appendix II, 2004 WL 1123351 (U.S.), 24, internal citations omitted. 
20 United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (12 July 
2002), 25. 
21 United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (12 July 
2002), 26. 
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circumstances may demand that … enemy combatant proceedings may be 
tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a 
time of on-going military conflict'22 and pointed out that 'the full protections 
that accompany challenges to detentions in other settings may prove 
unworkable and inappropriate in the enemy combatant setting…'.23 Justice 
Thomas' dissent went even further than the majority opinion in its use of 
crisis discourse. According to Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court's failure to 
understand the new reality of the War on Terror posed a threat to security of 
the nation: 'the Government's factual allegations will probably require the 
Government to divulge highly classified information to the purported enemy 
combatant, who might then upon release return to the fight armed with our 
most closely held secrets'.24 The Supreme Court and Court of Appeals' 
rulings in the Hamdi case exemplify how crisis discourse was used to justify a 
shift in legal discourse from prosecution toward precaution and prevention 
after 9/11. 
Yet, while such an analysis of legal decision-making shows how crisis 
discourse can make possible shifts in legal discourse, it risks giving the 
(mistaken) impression that the decision in this case was so fully determined by 
the crisis discourse that the decision could not have been any different. Such 
a perspective ignores what Jacques Derrida has called the 'iterability of 
language'. On the one hand, discourse can have a highly disciplining effect; it 
can constitute the subjects who live within it and make certain outcomes 
thinkable and others not. On the other hand, it is impossible for a discourse 
to be reproduced without its meaning changing, however slightly.25 This 
iterability is at the core of law's undecidability. The following part will 
introduce Derrida's iterability, after which I will use this concept to analyze 
a particular part of the Hamdi v. Rumsfeld case history to highlight the space 
that was available for the judge to resist crisis discourse. Subsequently, 
                                                 
22 Supreme Court of the United States, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 27, emphasis added. 
23 Supreme Court of the United States, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 28. 
24 Supreme Court of the United States, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 18.  
25 For more on the productive effects of discourse, see Stuart Hall, 'The Work of 
Representation' in Stuart Hall (ed), Representation: Cultural Representations and 
Signifying Practices (London, Sage 1997) 44. 
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section III of this article addresses the normative question of how the judge 
should deal with this available space.  
1. Iterability in Language and Law 
One of Jacques Derrida's main contributions to the theory of meaning is the 
idea that language's meaning is not stable but rather always ambiguous. This 
ambiguity is not merely a flaw or defect of language, but a fundamental 
feature of it.26 Neither the author's intention nor the words of a text can limit 
meaning totally, but instead Derrida stresses the multiple ways in which 
meaning escapes and transcends language. Derrida explains that each time a 
word is used, its meaning results from a combination of past uses of the same 
word as well as from the unique context in which it is used. Words are thus 
situated within chains of meaning (the previous uses of words linked together 
with the meanings attributed to them in the past) that partially fix their 
meaning. However, each time a word is used, that chain is slightly changed. 
Each time a word is used it is thus both the same and different: it relies upon 
its sameness with past uses, while at the same time its meaning can never be 
identical to that of past uses due to the influence the present context has on 
its meaning. It is this ability of a word to be repeated, while being altered, that 
Derrida calls iterability.27 
                                                 
26 Here Derrida departs from the structuralists he critiques. While structuralists 
acknowledged as well that language could be ambiguous, they saw this as a flaw to be 
overcome. Derrida, on the other hand, argued that this ambiguity was ineradicable. 
See further David Aram Kaiser and Paul Lufkin, 'Deconstructing Davis v. United 
States: Intention and Meaning in Ambiguous Requests for Counsel,' (2005) 32 
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 737, 741. 
27 Jacques Derrida, 'Signature Event Context' in Jacques Derrida (ed), Limited Inc 
(Illinois, Northwestern University Press 1988) 9. It has been noted that Derrida's 
iterability is similar to hermeneutics as set out most prominently by Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, see Michael N. Forester, 'Hermeneutics,' in Brian Leiter and Michael 
Rosen (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Continental Philosophy (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press 2007) 66. While I do not deny this similarity, I choose here 
Derrida's perspective because of the emphasis Derrida placed on the importance of 
ambiguity and alterity. While Gadamer and other followers of hermeneutics 
certainly would not reject these notions, they view them as less central to language 
and meaning than Derrida did. Derrida's emphasis on ambiguity means that 
Derrida's approach to meaning aims to keep the process of interpretation as open 
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While Derrida's notion of iterability emphasizes the indeterminacy of 
meaning, we must be careful not to interpret Derrida to mean that language 
can gain radically new meaning without being affected by its previous uses. 
The previous contexts in which the word was used and known to the receiver 
will still always impact the word, even in its new context. By the very fact that 
it is intelligible, the word's identity must be recognized as something used 
before. Simultaneously, the word will always carry more richness of meaning 
than can be exhausted by one particular usage of it. I interpret Derrida's work 
to highlight the fluidity of meaning and to see meaning as a product of 
negotiation rather than rigid definition – while not denying that meaning can 
be stabilized.28 
Judith Butler takes pains to show that this fluidity of meaning, while 
inescapable, does not mean it is easy to free oneself from the dominant 
meaning of a word. She gives the example of how using the word 'queer' 
creates a 'social bond among homophobic communities […] The 
interpellation echoes past interpellations, and binds the speakers, as if they 
spoke in unison across time'.29 In her words, 'discourse has a history' and each 
performative has a place in a 'chain of historicity' that constrains past and 
future use.30 In this way, Butler points to the force exerted by past uses of 
discourse and to the limits of individual agency in simply changing the 
meaning of a word. In her example on the use of the word 'queer' she argues 
that attempts to renegotiate or reappropriate the word by LGBTI 
communities will always have to reckon with the force of past meanings. 
There is no blank slate upon which new meanings can be inscribed; instead 
                                                 
and on-going as possible.  As Pierre Legrand notes, citing Colin Davis, 
'[h]ermeneutics would like to bring interpretation to a close, at least provisionally, 
though it knows it may not be able to; deconstruction would like not to stop, though 
it knows it will have to.' Pierre Legrand, 'Derrida's Gadamer,' in Simone Glanert & 
Fabien Girard (eds), Law's Hermeneutics: Other Investigations (London, Routledge 
2017) 160, citing Colin Davis, Critical Excess: Overreading in Derrida, Deleuze, 
Levinas, Žižek and Cavell (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press 2010) 55. 
28 In this interpretation of Derrida I follow, among others, Judith Butler, Bodies that 
Matter: On the Discursive Limits of 'Sex' (New York, Routledge 2011 (1993)) 172; Kaiser 
and Lufkin (n 26) 741; Legrand (n 27) 152; Sokoloff (n 9) 343-344; and Henry Staten, 
Wittgenstein and Derrida (Oxford, Basil Blackwell 1985) 152. 
29 Butler 2001 (n 28) 172. 
30 Ibid 172, 174. 
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words have places in chains of historicity that impede attempts to break 
those chains and insert the word into a new chain. Discourse exerts power by 
'echo[ing] prior actions, and accumulat[ing] the force of authority through the 
repetition or citation of a prior, authoritative set of practices'.31 
Legal decision-making relies heavily upon the aspect of iterability that 
emphasizes the repeatability of meaning. The force of law depends upon 
chains of meaning. One only needs to glance at a judicial decision to see these 
chains appear as the judge refers to past decisions and legislative documents 
that link together to justify the decision the judge renders. These 'citational 
chains' are weaved into a legal decision and mean that the judge never speaks 
alone.32 It is this reference back to past speakers that creates a 'citational 
force' that establishes the authority of the judge's speech act.33 The force of 
the decision is not a product of the judge's intentionality; her own 
preferences or values are irrelevant to the formal or persuasive power of the 
decision. Even if she wished her decision to be purely a function of her 
intention, so long as she continues to use these citational chains, the terms 
and concepts she uses will always 'exceed and undo the intentions and aims of 
any particular speaker in time'.34 It is these citational chains that produce the 
legal authority of the decision. It is because the decision is framed in terms of 
these chains and is bound to past speakers, past judges, 'as if they spoke in 
unison across time,'35 that the decision has the force of law. 
Such citational chains are, however, not present only in law. And the force 
these chains exert to (temporarily) fix meaning is not only a force exerted by 
legal discourses. Other discourses also exert this force. Moreover, no one 
citational chain exists in isolation; rather they interact to enrich and 
contaminate each other. This is how the crisis discourse that started in the 
realm of political discourse was able to be grafted onto and incorporated into 
legal discourse. While the aspect of repeatability that is present in iterability 
                                                 
31 Butler 2001 (n 28) 172, emphasis in original. 
32 See Butler 2001 (n 28) 214 note 5, '…every 'act' is an echo or citational chain, and it is 
its citationality that constitutes its performative force.' 
33 Ibid. 
34 Honig 2009 (n 8) 128. 
35 Butler 2001 (n 28) 172. 
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can thus reinforce meaning over time, this meaning can be complicated by 
competing citational chains that can become just as strong. 
Despite the constraining, disciplining force of discourse, perfect replication 
remains impossible. Next to the aspect of iterability that emphasizes the 
repeatability of language, there is the aspect of alterity of meaning. 
Contemporary thinkers like Judith Butler and Bonnie Honig have developed 
this aspect of iterability to show that while dominant discourses can produce 
and regulate meaning and subjectivities, these discourses and the meanings 
and subjects they create are always 'internally discontinuous'.36 Even when a 
word is used to intend its dominant meaning, this dominant meaning is 
always supplemented by opposing or differing meanings. While these other 
meanings might temporarily defer to the dominant meaning, they remain 
present in the margins. It might thus seem as if permanence is possible – the 
permanence of meaning across texts and time for example – but language in 
fact makes such permanence impossible.37 
While this aspect of iterability often receives less attention in judicial 
decision-making, the inevitable non-identical repetition of citational chains 
means that law cannot be applied in a machine-like way.38 Even despite our 
best attempts to repeat identically, it is impossible for a repetition to ever be 
an exact copy of the 'original': '[e]ach case is other, each decision is different 
and requires an absolutely unique interpretation, which no existing, coded 
rule can or ought to guarantee absolutely'.39 And so, in law, even when a judge 
attempts to faithfully reconstruct the citational chain that leads back to some 
original intention or law (if such an original moment exists) she will never be 
able to do so without in some way altering that chain. By applying the law to a 
                                                 
36 Judith Butler, 'Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in 
Phenomenology and Feminist Theory' (1988) 40 Theatre Journal 519, 520. 
37 Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics (Ithaca, Cornell 
University Press 1993) 123. 
38 Or perhaps more accurately, even a machine's behavior is not fully present to the 
machine itself as even machines can have parts that bend, break off and be melted 
(see Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trs. G.E.M. Anscombe 
(Oxford, Basil Blackwell 1958) nos. 193-94, cited in Honig 2009 (n 8) 55. 
39 Jacques Derrida, 'Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority', in Drucilla 
Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson (eds), Deconstruction and the 
Possibility of Justice (New York, Routledge 1992) 23. 
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new situation, a new link is added to the citational chain that is discursively 
posited by the judge. In doing so, the chain itself changes. It is this aspect of 
discourse that gives one the possibility to repeat differently. In the next part, 
I use the concept of iterability with its aspect of repetition and alterity to take 
a second look at the force crisis discourse exerted on the decision-making in 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and to examine one particular judge's different repetitions. 
2. Repeating Differently in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 
Derrida's concept of iterability highlights the failure of discourse to fully bind 
legal interpretation. In this part, I look at the judicial proceedings at the court 
of first instance in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld through the lens of iterability. I aim to 
show how, throughout the hearings at this level, the presiding judge was 
confronted by both aspects of iterability discussed above. I pay particular 
attention to the ways in which the aspect of alterity gave the presiding judge 
space to engage in the 'different sort of repeating' that Butler notes iterability 
makes possible.40 By looking at Hamdi from a perspective that highlights the 
space available for repeating differently, instead of only attending to the 
determining effects of the dominant discourse, a different picture emerges of 
how crisis discourse affected legal discourse. The court of first instance's 
judgment was overturned on appeal, and thus not relevant for purposes of 
legal precedent (and therefore often ignored by legal scholarship). Yet, this 
lower-level decision shows that even in the context of a highly coherent, 
dominant discourse like the crisis discourse employed in the War on Terror, 
space for resistance is possible. It also shows, however, the repercussions of 
engaging in such resistance. 
When Hamdi came before the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia, the presiding Judge Doumar initially took a highly critical view of 
the government's use of crisis discourse to justify its actions. For example, 
Judge Doumar questioned the executive's claim that the US was under 
extreme threat and was in a state of war. Judge Doumar challenged this 
discourse by asking the government's lawyer whether there had been any 
actual declaration of war. After the lawyer answered that there had not been 
                                                 
40 Butler 1988 (n 36) 520. 
110 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Vol. 11 No. 1 
 
a formal declaration,41 the judge explicitly voiced his uncertainty about the 
current state of affairs and his doubt as to whether to go along with the 
discourse of war: 'There have been a lot of people who say we have a war, but 
I don't know if this is really a war or what it is'.42 The judge questioned the 
government's assertions regarding the exceptionality of the circumstances, 
probing what the government's position was on any foreseeable end to these 
circumstances. Judge Doumar asked the government to clarify 'when are 
these hostilities going to end? Is he [Hamdi] going to be held forever? Can he 
be held for life?'43 
Judge Doumar's initial skepticism of the government's use of the crisis 
discourse was brought to a halt by the government's interlocutory appeal to 
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.44 In their ruling, the Court of 
Appeals instructed Judge Doumar to show more deference to the executive 
in considering the national security aspects of the case. Following this ruling, 
Judge Doumar began to emphasize the importance of national security, 
taking care in a subsequent ruling to note for example that 'the judiciary has 
traditionally shown 'great deference to the political branches when called 
upon to decide cases implicating sensitive matters of foreign policy, national 
security, or military affairs'.45 Yet, while Judge Doumar complied with the 
Court of Appeals' instruction to show deference to the executive in matters 
of national security, Judge Doumar managed to give this concept of national 
security a somewhat different shape than the Court of Appeals did. He 
framed his ruling in terms of national security – thus conforming to the terms 
of crisis discourse – but did so in a way that emphasized a particular side of 
                                                 
41 United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
Transcript of Proceedings before the Honorable R. G. Doumar (29 May 2002) Joint 
Appendix I, 2004 WL 1120871 (U.S.), 34. 
42 United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
(29 May 2002), 34. 
43 United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
(29 May 2002), 36. 
44 United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Decision 
on Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 
(12 July 2002), Joint Appendix II, 2004 WL 1123351 (U.S.), 21-26. 
45 United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
Order (16 August 2002) Joint Appendix II, 2004 WL 1123351 (U.S.), 5, citing the 
United States Court of Appeals' ruling Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 2000 (sic) WL 1483908. 
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the national security concept: the national values deemed worthy of 
protection. By citing a case not cited by the Court of Appeals, and neglecting 
to cite those the Court of Appeals did cite, Judge Doumar acknowledged the 
national security interest but interpreted this concept differently than the 
Court of Appeals had done.46 Whereas the Court of Appeals linked national 
security to times of active hostilities and military affairs, Judge Doumar 
expanded it to include the protection of individual liberty: 
The standard of judicial inquiry must also recognize that the 'concept of 
'national defense' cannot be deemed an end in itself, justifying any exercise 
of [executive] power designed to promote such a goal. Implicit in the term 
'national defense' is the notion of defending those values and ideals which 
sets this Nation apart … It would indeed by [sic] ironic if, in the name of 
national defense, we would sanction the subversion of one of those 
liberties … which makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile.' United States 
v. Robel.47 
Judge Doumar was thus able to follow the instruction of the higher court to 
rule within a discourse of crisis that highlighted the threats to national 
security while at the same time detaching 'national security' from the chain 
of meaning in which the Court of Appeals used it. Judge Doumar grafted this 
term onto a different chain, thus giving the words a different meaning.48 
                                                 
46 The United States Court of Appeals used a number of cases to ground its claims on 
national security (Dames & Moore v. Regan, United States v. The Three Friends, 
Stewart v. Kahn and The Prize Cases) that the District Court did not refer to. 
Instead, the District Court based its concept of national security on United States v. 
Robel, a case not mentioned by the Court of Appeals. For the Court of Appeals' 
references in this regard, see United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Decision on Appeal from the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Virginia (12 July 2002), Joint Appendix II, 2004 WL 1123351 
(U.S.), 23-34. For the citation used by the District Court, see United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Order (16 August 
2002) Joint Appendix II, 2004 WL 1123351 (U.S.), 5. 
47 United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
(16 August 2002), 6. Additions in brackets are Judge Doumar's. 
48 While there might be slight differences between 'national security' and 'national 
defense', Judge Doumar uses both terms interchangeably. This seems to reflect the 
definition given in by the US Department of Defense in both 2000 and 2018, which 
reads (in part): 'national security -- A collective term encompassing both national 
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In a similar vein, Judge Doumar included other elements of crisis discourse 
in his rulings, while at the same time warping their use to mean something 
different than how they had been used by the government in its legal 
arguments or in its public pronouncements on terrorism. One typical 
element of crisis discourse, as used by the government and the higher courts, 
was the emphasis on the unique nature of international terrorism. In court 
proceedings, the executive asserted that the 'forces responsible for the 
September 11 attack pose an 'unusual and extraordinary threat to the national 
security and foreign policy of the United States'49 and, according to the 
government, the wartime nature of the case meant that an entirely different 
paradigm should be applied to the case.50 In the rulings from the higher 
courts, a similar conception of the unique nature of the case was echoed, as 
was shown above in the citation from the Court of Appeals.51 Judge Doumar 
emphasized the novel elements of this case as well. Yet, instead of the 
singular threat posed by international terrorism, it was the unique nature of 
the government's action he focused his attention on. The judge asked the 
government's lawyer whether 'there [is] any case that you know of, any habeas 
corpus petition that you've ever heard of, prior to this case where counsel 
could not speak to the person being held?'.52 The government could not 
provide the court with such a precedent, upon which the judge noted in his 
                                                 
defense and foreign relations of the United States…' see Department of Defense 
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 2000, 305 available at 
http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/jp1_02(00).pdf and Department 
of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 2018, 162 available at 
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf?ver=2018-
08-27-122235-653. 
49 Respondents' Response to, and Motion to Dismiss, the Petition for a Writ of 
Habeas Corpus, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 1120871 (U.S.) 56, citing congressional language 
from the Authorization for the Use of Military Force, among others, emphasis 
added. 
50 Brief for Respondents-Appellants (Secretary of Defense) on Appeal to the United 
States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, (4 October 2002), 12. 
The respondents speak here of 'The entirely different paradigm in which this case 
arises – wartime detention of combatants, rather than criminal punishment.' 
51 At supra footnote 19. 
52 United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
Transcript of Proceedings before the Honorable R. G. Doumar (13 August 2002) 
Joint Appendix I, 2004 WL 1120871 (U.S.), 85. 
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decision: 'this case appears to be the first in American jurisprudence where 
an American citizen has been held incommunicado and subjected to an 
indefinite detention in the continental United States without charges, 
without any findings by a military tribunal, and without access to a lawyer'.53 
By pointing out the unique nature of this case, Judge Doumar adopted the 
terms of crisis discourse but decoupled crisis discourse's emphasis on 
uniqueness from the threat posed by international terrorism. The 
government had emphasized the existential threat of terrorism54 and the risk 
that judicial involvement in this case would diminish 'the prestige of our 
commanders; divert[…] their attention from the war effort and possibly 
require […] them to return from abroad to be called to account in our courts; 
and risk […] a conflict of military and judicial opinion'.55 Judge Doumar, 
however, spoke of an existential threat to the identity of the United States, 
the values of the Constitution and the risk of chaos that comes with 
undermining that identity and those values. Judge Doumar detailed this risk 
elaborately: 
We must protect the freedoms of even those who hate us, and that we may 
find objectionable. If we fail in this task, we become victims of the 
precedents we create. We have prided ourselves on being a nation of laws 
applying equally to all and not a nation of men who have few or no standards. 
The warlords of Afghanistan may have been in the business of pillage and 
plunder. We cannot descend to their standards without debasing ourselves. 
We must preserve the rights afforded to us by our Constitution and laws for 
without it we return of the chaos of a rule of men and not of laws.56 
Unlike in the dominant use of crisis discourse by the government, Judge 
Doumar did not interpret the novelty and severity of the threat to mean that 
completely new procedures were necessary. To the contrary, Judge Doumar 
seemed to be pointing out the uniqueness of the detention of Mr. Hamdi and 
                                                 
53 United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 
(16 August 2002), 2.  
54 Henderson 2014 (n 12) 6. 
55 Brief for Respondents-Appellants at the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth 
Circuit, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (June 19, 2002) 2002 WL 32728567 (C.A.4), 6. 
56 United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 
(16 August 2002), 9. 
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the threat this posed to constitutional values in order to reject the 
government's crisis discourse. 
By using the elements of crisis discourse in his ruling, but decoupling them 
from previous chains of meaning, Judge Doumar was able to repeat the 
dominant discourse while simultaneously shifting its meaning. As Judge 
Doumar's approach to this case shows, the shift toward precaution in post-
9/11 counter-terrorism cases was a shift that was not dictated by the existence 
of the dominant crisis discourse alone, nor one that went uncontested. 
Whether intentionally or not, Judge Doumar used the space available to 
repeat differently and employed the terms of crisis discourse in a way that 
challenged and undermined that same discourse. But this resistance to the 
dominant crisis discourse was not successful in this instance. After Judge 
Doumar ruled that Mr. Hamdi should be allowed access to a lawyer, the 
government refused to comply with his order. This placed the court of first 
instance in a difficult and unusual position. The court's authority depends on 
its rulings being respected by the other branches of government, even when 
these other branches disagree. The only tool the court has in cases when a 
branch of government threatens non-compliance is to hold the 
representative in contempt of court, upon which the court can decide to 
detain the representative in jail. The government's refusal to comply 
threatened a clash between the judiciary and the executive, a clash Judge 
Doumar was wary to engage in, as shown by his explicit remark that he was 
'not interested in throwing the Secretary of Defense in jail' for contempt of 
court.57 Not complying with the terms of crisis discourse was thus met with a 
point-blank challenge to the authority of the judge, a challenge the executive 
won. 
In the end, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit overruled the District 
Court's rulings on the case, holding that Mr. Hamdi had no right to a lawyer 
or to contest the facts presented by the government as to his enemy 
combatant status. According to the Court of Appeals, this was the 
appropriate attitude a court must show toward the executive in a time of war. 
After the decision of the Court of Appeals, the case was heard by the Supreme 
                                                 
57 United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, Transcript of Telephonic Conference before the Honorable Robert G. 
Doumar (20 August 2002) Joint Appendix II, 2004 WL 1123351 (U.S.), 13-17. 
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Court. The Supreme Court affirmed many of the District Court's orders, but 
did so far more clearly within the precautionary framework of preventive, 
administrative law than the District Court did. The Supreme Court accepted 
the argument that the standard of review for Mr. Hamdi's detention should 
be lower than the standard of review for the detention of someone charged 
with a crime, because of the criminal law standards' 'uncommon potential to 
burden the executive at a time of on-going military conflict'.58  
III. THE DECISION AND RESPONSIBILITY 
The first section of this article discussed how iterability can be seen as 
present in judicial judgments: judgments are rendered in terms of citational 
chains that restrain and limit possible meanings of the law, while at the same 
time the judgment cannot help but have an aspect of alterity. I showed how 
Judge Doumar's use of this space for changing meanings made certain terms 
of the crisis discourse mean something different. In the present section, I 
consider how a judge should use this space for repeating differently. Should 
the judge maintain the fiction of the law as decidable and unified or rather 
intentionally engage with and take account of its undecidable aspects? This is 
a normative question and answering this question requires a shift in 
approach. Whereas section II of this article focused on describing crisis 
discourse and the possibility for repeating this discourse differently, the 
question addressed in section III requires a turn toward more fundamental 
matters of legal philosophy. This section proceeds as follows. To begin the 
enquiry into how judges should decide between the different possible 
meanings, I turn to Ronald Dworkin's views on how judges interpret the law. 
Dworkin was a legal scholar who, like Derrida, was strongly influenced by 
questions of meaning-making and helped to develop a hermeneutic theory of 
law. Dworkin acknowledges that law is not unified but argues that the judge, 
in her construction of the law as if it were, can come to an answer that she is 
convinced is the one right answer. I proceed to critique Dworkin's view of 
adjudication based on a reading of Derrida that highlights the role of power 
relations in attempting to unify law. At the end, I return to Derrida's 
                                                 
58 Supreme Court of the United States, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 27. 
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understanding of undecidability in law to present the judge with a possible 
way forward. 
1. Dworkin's Undecidable Chain of Meaning 
Ronald Dworkin sets out a theory of legal meaning that sees law as an 
argumentative practice.59 Instead of relying on the original intent of the 
author of the law, Dworkin proposes that the meaning of law is constructed; 
meaning is made – not found. This interpretive process is one that combines 
a responsibility to remain faithful to legal tradition with the recognition that, 
in order to do so, the judge must engage in some type of creative activity.60 
Approaching the issue from the perspective of the judge presented with a 
question of interpretation, Dworkin uses the metaphor of a 'chain novel' to 
show how this interpretive activity takes place. Dworkin explains: 
Each judge must regard himself, in deciding the new case before him, as a 
partner in a complex chain enterprise of which innumerable decisions, 
structures, conventions, and practices are the history; it is his job to continue 
that history in to the future through what he does on that day. He must 
interpret what has gone before because he has a responsibility to advance the 
enterprise in hand rather than strike out in some new direction of his own. 
So he must determine, according to his own judgment, what the earlier 
decisions come to, what the point or theme of the practice so far, taken as a 
whole, really is.61 
The first task of the judge is thus to construct a view of the law as if it were a 
'coherent whole' and decide the case at hand in a way that best fits within this 
coherence.62 As Dworkin explains it, still in terms of his chain novel 
metaphor, it is the judge's job to as much as possible write 'a single, unified 
novel rather than, for example, a series of independent short stories with 
characters bearing the same names'.63 In Dworkin's comparison between 
interpretation of art and of law, he explains that in his view interpretation 
must attempt to show the text 'as the best work of art it can be', insisting that 
                                                 
59 Ronald Dworkin, 'Law and Interpretation' (1982) 9 Critical Inquiry 179. 
60 At least in the case of interpreting principles, see John McGarry, Intention, Supremacy 
and the Theories of Judicial Review (London, Routledge 2017), 21-22. 
61 Dworkin 1985 (n 7) 159, emphasis in original. 
62 McGarry (n 60) 19. 
63 Dworkin 1985 (n 7) 159. 
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the 'it' of the text must be respected, instead of 'changing it into a different 
one'.64 The judge must decide which reading of the chain is the best one and 
continue that reading.65 
Next to this faithfulness to the enterprise and the avoidance of taking 'some 
new direction of his own', Dworkin acknowledges the judge does more than 
simply receive the meaning of the law. Creativity is necessary to advance legal 
history into the future, to interpret what that history means for us today.66 
Crucially, Dworkin does not deny that in this process of construction, the 
judge will be affected by politics. Indeed, he remarks that 'interpretation in 
law is essentially political',67 that law is 'deeply and thoroughly political'68 and 
that legal interpretation will be linked to the interpreter's views on political 
morality, to 'beliefs other judges need not share'.69 But, according to 
Dworkin, one can only speak of a judge making new law in a 'trivial sense'.70 
Instead of setting out to depart from the law as it stands, it is the judge's duty 
to – with the aid of political morality – construct a theory of law that best fits 
the legal practice as it currently is and that provides the best normative 
justification of this practice.71 In effect, the judge is to endeavor to unify the 
diffuse nature of law, to 'construct a unity from the disparate elements'72 of 
legal history and practice and to 'impos[e] purpose' on the law to 'make of it 
the best possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken to 
belong'.73 While Dworkin acknowledges that in fact 'the law may not be a 
seamless web', he entreats the judge to 'treat it as if it were'.74 This shall 
subsequently provide the judge with the soundest theory of law, based on 
which she can interpret the law. The judge's soundest theory of law constrains 
                                                 
64 Dworkin 1982 (n 59) 183. 
65 Ibid 194. 
66 Anne Barron, 'Ronald Dworkin and the Challenge of Postmodernism' in Alan Hunt 
(ed), Reading Dworkin Critically (Oxford, Berg Publishers 1992) 148. 
67 Dworkin 1985 (n 7) 162. 
68 Dworkin 1982 (n 59) 179. 
69 Dworkin 1985 (n 7) 162. 
70 Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Oxford, Hart Publishing 1998) 6. 
71 Dworkin 1985 (n 7) 160. 
72 Barron (n 66) 149. 
73 Dworkin 1998 (n 70) 52. 
74 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University 
Press 1977) 116. 
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her in her interpretation of the particular law at hand: the answer she must 
give is that which best fits within the web of meaning she has constructed. 
The creativity necessary in legal interpretation is, for Dworkin, not the 
creativity of a judge faced with a blank slate upon which any interpretation 
can be projected.75 The limit to this creativity is found in the judge's duty to 
remain faithful to advancing the enterprise at hand,76 an enterprise 
characterized by the 'integrity and coherence of law as an institution'.77 In 
every judge's political morality, there must be some sense of this integrity of 
law that subsequently acts as an 'overriding constraint' on the judge's 
decision.78 
In many ways, Dworkin's 'chain novel' approach to law echoes Derrida's 
iterability. Dworkin's indebtedness to the larger hermeneutic tradition is an 
indebtedness Derrida shares.79 This connection to hermeneutics allows both 
authors to see the dual nature of the determinedness and ambiguity of 
meaning in language and law. Yet, while Dworkin's hermeneutics remains 
focused on striving for unity, Derrida's 'radical hermeneutics' emphasizes the 
discord ever-present in this constructed fiction of unity.80 As Derrida 
stresses, 'conventions, institutions and consensus are stabilizations 
(sometimes stabilizations of great duration, sometimes micro-stabilizations)' 
and 'this means that they are stabilizations of something essentially unstable 
and chaotic'.81 The stabilization – the construction of the purpose and 
integrity of law – is necessary because of the very fact that 'stability is not 
natural'.82 
How does one get from chaos to a non-natural stability? The construction of 
a unified version of law from an inherently non-unified field of meaning 
                                                 
75 Dworkin 1985 (n 7) 164. 
76 Barron (n 66) 149.  
77 Dworkin 1985 (n 7) 161. 
78 Dworkin 1982 (n 59) 195. 
79 Both particularly indebted to Gadamer's work on hermeneutics. Derrida, however, 
often fails to acknowledge this indebtedness, see footnote 111 in Forester (n 27) 66. 
80 John Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction and the Hermeneutic 
Project (Bloomington, Indiana University Press 1987). 
81 Jacques Derrida, 'Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism' in Chantal Mouffe 
(ed), Deconstruction and Pragmatism (London, Routledge 1996) 83. 
82 Ibid. 
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requires an exercise of power, an imposition of will, that suppresses certain 
alternatives while favoring others. Derrida's work on deconstruction 
highlights the power play present in this striving for unity. Derrida 
acknowledges the possibility of constraint that discourse brings, but 
highlights that the stability and unity that interpreters might perceive are not 
neutral constructions. Instead, they are the result of contingent processes 
characterized by power relations. Even after an exertion of power has 
constructed one fiction of unity over another, the alternatives do not 
disappear. The simulated stability remains contaminated by the non-unity 
from which it is constructed.83 As a number of contemporary scholars have 
emphasized, relying on Derrida, these possible alternatives remain present 
and continually challenge the boundary as drawn.84 These 'remainders', while 
relegated to the margins in the attempt to construct a unified interpretation 
of law, cannot be expunged.85 They continue to exist, continue to threaten 
the destabilization of the constructed unity in favor of other possible unities. 
Dworkin does not deny that something external to law is necessary to make 
the step from the non-unified field of meaning to the coherent construction 
of law. He assumes the judge's access to a political morality will provide the 
steady ground necessary to bridge this gap. Dworkin, however, filters out all 
the conflictual, contradictory and power-related aspects of both (legal) 
interpretation and the political morality the judge needs for this 
interpretation. He fails to realize that this political morality is itself 'the 
contingent outcome of a perpetual and radically undecidable conflict of 
interpretations'.86 Thus while the political morality that a judge uses might 
                                                 
83 Staten (n 28) 152. 
84 Aletta J. Norval, 'Hegemony after Deconstruction: The Consequences of 
Undecidability' (2004) 9 Journal of Political Ideologies 139, 142; E.E. Berns, 
'Decision, Hegemony and Law: Derrida and Laclau' (1996) 22 Philosophy & Social 
Criticism 71, 74. Both Norval and Berns attribute this insight to Ernesto Laclau in, 
among others, Ernesto Laclau, 'The Impossibility of Society' (1983) 7 Canadian 
Journal of Political and Social Theory 21. 
85 Honig 1993 (n 37) 143-146. 
86 Barron (n 66) 150. Dworkin certainly mentions the role of politics in interpretation 
but the politics that is implicated in his process of constructing this soundest theory 
of the law is a form of politics purified of power relations. All actual conflictual 
aspects of politics seem to be given no meaningful role to play in Dworkin's theory 
of law. See Alan Hunt, 'Law's Empire or Legal Imperialism?' in Alan Hunt (ed), 
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constrain her interpretation, and in this sense provide some ground, it is itself 
a contingent, human-made product of power relations. The ground political 
morality provides, therefore, cannot be stable or final. To put this in other 
words, Dworkin seems to assume that the judge's political morality is the 
starting point in the interpretive process, instead of the object of political 
struggle. Instead of political morality providing the solid ground that 
Dworkin seeks in order to avoid arbitrariness, political morality is itself the 
product of contingent struggles over meaning that are never finally settled 
and are constantly characterized by relations of power. The political morality 
that the judge must use to solve the interpretive conflict entails choosing 
sides in the political conflict87 and is itself not grounded on anything outside 
of the struggle the judge chooses sides in. If political morality is itself a 
contingent outcome, the judge's interpretation is not the end of an 
interpretive conflict but rather a step in the chain of political conflict that, 
while creating the fiction of unity, 'does not transcend the political fray' but 
is in fact at its center.88 
We are left with the image of law as a partially structured, partially 
unstructured field; a field of 'structured undecidability'.89 Interpretation of 
this field is indeed constrained by chains of meaning and discourses of 
political morality, but these constraints fail to ever fully eliminate the 
remainders that will continue to challenge the fictional unity. The 
construction of (legal) meaning is characterized by contestation and struggle 
over the type of fictional unity that is constructed, and the political morality 
that provides so much guidance to Dworkin's judge is itself nothing more 
than the product of such conflicts over meaning. We thus lose any ultimate 
ground with which to justify (legal) interpretation. This is not to say that 
                                                 
Reading Dworkin Critically (Oxford, Berg Publishers 1992) 41; Andrew Altman, 'Legal 
Realism, Critical Legal Studies and Dworkin' (1986) 15 Philosophy & Public Affairs 
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87 See for example Hoy's interpretation of Roberto Unger's critique of Dworkin in Hoy 
(n 86) 175. 
88 Bonnie Honig, 'Between Decision and Deliberation: Political Paradox in 
Democratic Theory' (2007) 101 American Political Science Review 1, 6. 
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there are no discourses that exert power to constrict possible meanings and 
enable others, but rather that the ground these discourses provide is in the 
end contingent and does no rest on any ultimate justification.90 
2. Lucidly Plunging into the Night of Undecidability91 
In the midst of this lack of final justification, the instant of decision is 
'madness'.92 The decision acts 'in the night of nonknowledge and nonrule'93 – 
not because the judge has not prepared herself with 'knowledge, by 
information, by infinite analysis'94 but because undecidability means that any 
interpretation is an imposition that cannot be grounded in final, ultimate 
knowledge or guarantees.95 At the same time, the structured nature of this 
undecidability means that the decision is not an absolute beginning.96 Instead, 
this decision is a derivative beginning and is influenced, shaped and 
determined to a large extent by the citational chains of dominant discourses. 
Discourse and the power it exerts on social meaning remains significant and 
inescapable. What Derrida's perspective highlights is that, despite the 
strength of these discourses, they ultimately remain ungrounded. These 
discourses retain a measure of disorder that can never be erased from the 
incomplete and unstable (dis)unity of meaning. 
                                                 
90 Judith Butler, 'Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of 
"Postmodernism"' in Judith Butler and J.W. Scott (eds), Feminists Theorize the 
Political (New York, Routledge 1992) 3-21. See further Oliver Marchart, Post-
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prepared mind and apply it here to undecidability.  
92 Derrida 1992 (n 39) 26 (with reference to Kierkegaard). 
93 Ibid.  
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Importantly, stabilizing meaning into a fictional unity is the result of power 
exercised in relations between those struggling over multiple different 
possible constructions of unity. This realization calls on those involved in 
decision-making to recognize two things at the same time, namely that their 
'most basic commitments regarding self, other, and the beyond human are 
[…] both fundamental and contestable'.97 Decision-makers have to recognize 
that despite their conviction in the rightness of their answer, their answer is 
in fact but one of many possibilities. In the end, 'I can never be completely 
satisfied that I have made a good choice since a decision in favour of one 
alternative is always to the detriment of another one'.98 
Let me reassure the reader: recognizing the lack of ultimate ground for (legal) 
interpretation does not mean law should be abandoned nor that construction 
of unity should be avoided.99 It does mean, however, that we are placed before 
the question how we are to act, given this lack of ultimate ground. More 
concretely, how is the judge to decide if she cannot ground her decision on 
the ultimate conviction that her answer is right? Derrida argues that to 
experience and acknowledge this impasse – this need to decide while not 
having final ground on which to ground the decision – is in fact to experience 
responsibility. In order to find one's way through this impasse, one must 
experience it not as a 'paralyzing structure, something that simply blocks the 
way', but instead we must acknowledge that 'we have to go through pain and 
[…] a situation in which I do not know what to do'. This 'aporia is what we 
have to go through in order to take responsibility and to act or decide'.100 
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University Press 2009) 815, emphasis added. 
98 Chantal Mouffe, 'Deconstruction, Pragmatism and the Politics of Democracy' in 
Chantal Mouffe (ed), Deconstruction and Pragmatism (London, Routledge 1996) 9. 
99 According to Henry Staten, Derrida's work calls on us to deconstruct the unity of 
law, 'not in disrespect for truth and disobedience to the law, and certainly not in 
flight from the demands of a reality which is too stern and fatherly to be faced, but 
because it is the fantasized fulfillment of an infantile wish.' He admits that there is 
no 'purifying ourselves of this wish, but we can see it in its primitive intensity,' see 
Staten (n 28) 154. 
100 Richard Kearney, 'On Forgiveness: A Roundtable Discussion with Jacques Derrida' 
in John D. Caputo, Mark Dooley & Machael J. Scanlon (eds), Questioning God 
(Bloomington, Indiana University Press 2001) 62. 
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If the decision-maker acknowledges that 'I have not done enough',101 that she 
can never do enough to find a final ground for her decision in a field of 
structured undecidability, she has to face the question of how she can take 
responsibility for the alternative answers she has excluded with her decision. 
For Derrida, the moment a decision-maker is confronted with undecidability 
is where responsibility comes in. Responsibility starts, Derrida says, 'when I 
don't know what to do'.102 Now, it is likely true that the judge will feel the 
conviction Dworkin speaks of, that she has found the one right answer. But 
if she simultaneously recognizes that this conviction, while fundamental, is 
also contestable, the way to move forward with the decision is by showing 
responsibility for the other possibilities her decision has foreclosed. 
Derrida tells us that the decision must ensure that 'the memory of the 
undecidability […] keep[s] a living trace that forever marks a decision as such 
[…] the undecidable remains caught, lodged, as a ghost at least, but an 
essential ghost, in every decision, in every event of decision'.103 While each 
judgment remains lacking an ultimate, non-contingent ground, this need not 
be a call to refrain from judgment. Instead, it is an appeal to the judge to 
ensure she acknowledges her judgment's groundlessness by keeping open the 
possibility that that which was excluded from the judge's interpretation of 
the law, can work to reverse its exclusion by continuing to participate in the 
struggle over meaning. If the judge takes account of the fact that she can 
never be sure her decision is the one right one, despite her deep conviction 
that it is, she is faced with a responsibility. This is the responsibility to form 
her decision in such a way that maintains the reversibility of the exclusion the 
decision effects. 
Let me specify what or who I entreat the judge not to permanently exclude. 
My concern here is not for the particular chain of meaning of discourse. 
Structured undecidability means that it is impossible to ever completely, 
irreversibly exclude a particular alternative meaning from the discursive 
order. There will always be some space - however small - for that meaning to 
                                                 
101 Derrida 1996 (n 81) 87. 
102 Jacques Derrida, 'Following Theory: Interview with Nicholas Royle, Christopher 
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reappear to challenge the hegemonic discourse. My concern is for the carrier 
of that alternative meaning. While it is true that in a structural sense no 
alternative meaning can be permanently removed from the realm of possible 
future meanings, this is of course not the case for the agent needed to engage 
in the discursive struggle over meaning that is necessary to allow a non-
dominant meaning to gain prominence. Alternative interpretations cannot 
fight for themselves, they cannot give voice to themselves. They need a 
human to convey them.104 The problem is thus not that potential alternative 
meanings will be excluded permanently but that the human who conveys 
them will be. While the judge cannot help but take sides in the struggle over 
meaning, when she decides to construct one coherent meaning of the law 
over possible others, she can ensure that her intervention remains 
contestable by those individuals on the losing end of this struggle. 
How must the judge ensure her decision does not permanently exclude the 
other? At a fundamental level, avoiding permanent exclusion means ensuring 
the judge's decision does not result in what has been termed 'legal invisibility', 
the situation in which the other is put in a position where he lacks the right 
to be recognized under the law.105 Legal invisibility, as a type of civil death, 
excludes the other so fully that he loses his right of independent action and is 
treated as a passive object to be possessed or ruled over instead of a legal 
subject. He is, in fact, subjected to law without the corresponding rights of a 
legal subject.106 In such instances, the other is left with no (legal) means to 
challenge the decision which excluded him and the discourse that supports 
that decision. 
                                                 
104 At least according to currently accepted insights. It remains possible that at some 
point non-human animals or robots might become similarly capable of such struggle 
over meaning.  
105 I borrow this term 'legal invisibility' from Bernadette Atuahene, 'From Reparation 
to Restoration: Moving Beyond Restoring Property Rights to Restoring Political 
and Economic Visibility' (2007) 60 Southern Methodist University Law Review 1425 
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Importantly, responsibility for the other does not need to imply that the 
judge in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld should have necessarily resisted the rupture in legal 
meaning crisis discourse precipitated, nor, conversely, that the judge should 
have necessarily comported herself with this newly dominant discourse. 
Taking responsibility in the face of structured undecidability is an activity 
that rises above arguments about the merits of the various legal or political 
arguments put forth within the struggle over meaning. Instead, I argue that 
in Hamdi this responsibility calls on the judge to take into account the 
possibility that the dominant discourse of crisis might be wrong. Concretely 
this means accepting that the threat presumed to justify the indefinite 
detention may not actually be present. Or, it might be the case that 
preventive detention might not adequately address the threat, even if one is 
in fact posed. It could be that the employed political morality is actually 
immoral. The judge cannot be sure. She should reckon with these possibilities 
by ensuring her decision does not permanently prevent future decisions from 
correcting such possible mistakes. Thus, while it may be impossible for the 
judge's interpretation to avoid being influenced by both legal and political 
discourses, and while it may be impossible for the judge's interpretation to 
avoid taking sides in the conflict over meaning, the task of the judge must be 
to decide in a way that does not shut down this conflict permanently. 
To become even more concrete on the question of how the judge should 
ensure her decision does not exclude the other permanently, let me say 
something about the application of this idea to Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. In this 
particular case, I would call upon the judge to take account of the effects of 
her decision on Mr. Hamdi's ability to participate in the discursive struggle 
over his construction as another who is to be excluded. Such taking account 
could include asking whether the preventive detention of Mr. Hamdi called 
for by the government and discursively justified by the crisis discourse 
restricted his ability to participate in public and legal debate, denied him 
recognition under the law as a legal subject and whether his detention would 
in fact be indefinite, without a clear way to know when it must end. Such 
effects would shut down Mr. Hamdi's ability to challenge his exclusion and 
thus would deny the possibility that his exclusion might be mistaken. If the 
answer to these questions is affirmative, it is the judge's responsibility to 
engage in a 'subversive repetition' of the law to result in a decision with less 
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exclusionary effects.107 In this way, the judge can take responsibility for the 
inevitably exclusionary nature of her decision, by ensuring that this exclusion 
is not permanently entrenched but instead remains contestable by those who 
are excluded. By doing so, the dilemma posed by the need for the judge's 
decision and the impossibility of grounding this decision can be temporarily 
mediated to such an extent that the groundless decision can be taken 
responsibly. 
Judges will undoubtedly differ over how such 'taking account' will look in 
practice and will disagree on the interpretation of the exclusionary effects of 
their decisions. It is not my aim to provide a one-size-fits-all instruction that 
eliminates this disagreement. Indeed, it is this very possibility of 
disagreement that highlights the need for each judge to decide each 
individual case while acknowledging the ever-present possibility that she 
might be wrong. Yet, if the judge acknowledges undecidability, the judge can 
bring Dworkin's theory of interpretation to its logical conclusion: if political 
morality is necessary to interpret law, and if political morality is undecidable, 
then so are decisions based on that political morality. While, as Dworkin 
proposes, a decision that constructs the law is a necessary response to such 
undecidability in law, the decision must acknowledge the contingency of this 
construction by deciding in a way that shows responsibility toward the 
excluded other. In this way, recognizing the fundamental instability of 
meaning presents us with a chance108 to put 'pressure on [law] to be 
something more than maintenance of the dominant power relations of the 
community'.109 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This article shows how attention to iterability reveals the unstable and 
internally discontinuous nature of dominant discourses, such as the crisis 
discourse that took hold after 9/11. The Hamdi case addressed above shows 
how judges can take different orientations in a case involving a strong 
dominant discourse and thus how even in such cases space remains for 
alterity. The ruling of Judge Doumar in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld shows how 
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citational chains can be opened up and reconstructed, leading to new 
meanings and 'subversive repetitions'.110 Yet, the intention of Judge Doumar, 
present to some extent in the instant of decision, is not fully determinate. He 
is bound by the language game of the law and, in order for his rulings to be 
intelligible as law, he must remain within this language game. What this case 
also shows is the institutional backlash that is often the consequence of 
failing to rule within the dominant discourse. 
The conclusion is that law – like language – is characterized by structured 
undecidability. There is always an element of alterity in every repetition, 
which means that the law cannot simply be applied without changing the 
meaning of the law itself. Every decision rendered by a judge implies some 
sort of change. And, at the same time, the structure of intelligible language 
requires speakers to remain within the particular language game they are 
playing. Citational chains lend language its seemingly determinate quality. 
Within this undecidability between alterity and repetition, Dworkin and 
Derrida would agree, meaning must be constructed. But, importantly, my 
reading of Derrida shows that the construction of unity of meaning out of 
dissensus requires the exertion of power. The argument here thus goes 
beyond Dworkin's recognition of the role political morality plays in legal 
interpretation to show that the judge cannot engage in such a construction of 
unity without becoming a participant in the struggle over meaning. The last 
part of this article asked how the judge should respond to her inevitable 
implication in this struggle. I identified the main quality of a proper judicial 
decision in conditions of undecidability: whether the judge recognizes the 
contingency of her own decision. This recognition should lead to a decision 
that avoids the permanent exclusion of the other. 
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